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Abstract
We analyze a unique data set from a massively-multiplayer online video
game economy called The Kingdom of Loathing1 to assess the viability of
these markets in conducting economic research. The data consist of every
transaction in a market with over one million players over three years of
real time. We ﬁnd that 1) the game markets are efﬁcient, 2) the complexity
of the product determines information diffusion times, and 3) we can clas-
sify which and how players participate in trade.
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11 Introduction
We use data from an online game economy to examine trade and other market
behaviours, and to analyse different impacts on information diffusion as well
as trading decisions. Online game markets provide feasible economic data on
virtual game goods and therefore lead to new and interesting ways to analyse
old economic questions. In particular, we provide a new way to compute infor-
mation diffusion and moderators thereof by using game-wiki data, and show
that players substitute game-speciﬁc human capital with more general human
capital (“market-savvyness”), to pursue their goals.
Our motivating question is whether players in online economies behave as
they would in real-world economies. In other words, does online game market
behaviour follow the same rules as real market behaviour? Real-world eco-
nomic activities are undertaken to create more, and more enjoyable, leisure
time (Oswald, 1997). Thus, agents pursue economic activities to be able to
play2: to be able to ignore real-world economics. We examine whether an on-
line game environment, with users entering to not apply real-world economics,
still provides valid economic data to test real-world behaviours.
Bainbridge (2007) argues that online worlds offer many new venues for re-
search. Castronova et al. (2009) and Williams et al. (2011) created online games
speciﬁcally to conduct ﬁeld experiments. Others use existing online (non-
game) worlds as means of communication and have found valid responses
(Chesney et al., 2009).
Online games are no niche market. There are 46 million players of online
games, with a revenue of 3.8 billion US$ in 2009 for the United States alone.3
2Happiness economics sees economic activities only as a means to an end: ultimately, an indi-
vidual wants to become “happier” (maximise utility). For recent literature, see for example Tella
et al. (2003), Frey and Stutzer (2008), and Konow and Earley (2008).
3Today’s Gamers report 09: http://www.gamesindustry.com/about-newzoo/todaysgamers_
graphs_MMO, accessed March 15, 2010
2World of Warcraft, the most well-known online game, has over 11 million sub-
scribers4, each contributing between 12.99$ and 14.99$ per month, for total rev-
enuesofover1.5billionUS$. SocialgamesspecialistZynga(creatorofFarmville
on Facebook) has reported5 a revenue for 2010 of 597 million US$ to the SEC.
Online games provide economies, marketplaces, trades, and currencies just
like the real world, and face the same fundamental challenges. For example,
the Korean supreme court has ruled6 that virtual and real money are legally
exchangeable. Crime (e.g. theft) in online worlds and cyberspace is prosecuted
just like in traditional legal settings. The German police in the city of Bochum7
are searching for stolen “Phoenix boots” and seven million “yang” that were
reported stolen from a citizen’s online game character. A Dutch court has con-
victed8 two teenagers of stealing virtual items in an online game and sentenced
them to community service.
McGonigal (2011) suggests that online games provide insight to the real
world, and vice-versa. Easy access to online non-game data has inspired its use
as valid quasi-experimental data in many cases already: McCarthy (2010) fol-
lows up online search keywords to monitor suicide risks of the US population,
and Ginsberg et al. (2009) to follow inﬂuenza epidemics. Markey and Markey
(2010) use internet pornography trafﬁc intensity to predict testosterone levels
in users. Askitas and Zimmermann (2009) use google search trends to pre-
dict unemployment rates – a faster and less expensive method than the well-




cessed August 5, 2010
6http://www.massively.com/2010/01/13/korea-rules-that-virtual-currencies-can-
be-exchanged-for-real-mo/, accessed March 15, 2010
7http://www.polizei-nrw.de/presseportal/behoerden/bochum/article/meldung-
090128-131735-55-117.html (ofﬁcial press release, in German), accessed March 15, 2010
8http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/22/teens_sentenced_for_runescape_item_
theft/, accessed March 15, 2010
3dating agencies to test matching theories and equilibria.
Using game data is thus an extension of this trend. It has already been used
in the natural sciences: Cooper et al. (2010) created a multiplayer “shooter”
game, where players would walk in a world full of protein strings while shoot-
ing/killing anomalies (bad proteins). The best players are actually better at
ﬁnding these anomalies than the algorithms used by the scientists.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2 provides
an overview of the relevant literature and constructs the hypothesis. Section 3
describes the data used, with section 4 presenting our results. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Related Literature and Hypothesises
We do not examine interactions between real and virtual worlds. Rather, we
show that online game markets follow predictions from standard economic
theory, and can thus be interpreted and exploited as quasi-ﬁeld experiment
data.
Online games are just that; games. There is no inherent (real-world) risk
to in-game actions, and an individual’s income will not usually depend on his
in-game choices. Games are generally played by users for recreation, enjoy-
ment, and fun. Nevertheless, economic research has begun to see games as a
valid tool in an economist’s toolbox. We argue that games can be used as a
controlled ﬁeld experiment, if done correctly. Harrison and List (2004) classify
six areas in which ﬁeld experiments can provide insights: the subject pool, the
information subjects bring with them to the experiment, the commodities used
in the experiment, the task or the rules applied in the experiment, the stakes,
and the environment used. For our dataset and analysis, we can contribute at
least partly to any of these six ﬁelds, with the ﬁrst two (subject pool and infor-
4mation these bring with them) and fourth (task and rules of the experiment)
ﬁeld being those with the highest real-world relevance.
A number of researchers have already used the internet and virtual worlds
as settings for experiments. For example, Drehmann et al. (2005) set up exper-
iments to test the theory of informational cascades in ﬁnancial markets. Set-
ting up a (closed) online game environment speciﬁcally as a ﬁeld experiment
is fairly new: two examples are Castronova et al. (2009) and Williams et al.
(2011). Castronova et al. (2009) set up two versions of an online game, identi-
cal but for a price difference for a single good. Players have a marginal rate of
substitution for in-game goods, and the authors were able to compute an elas-
ticity of demand. Williams et al. (2011) set up a game world with the explicit
goal to use it as an experiment. They report the structure of the experiment,
and the data. Their results suggest that games can be used as a controlled ex-
periment by examining the effects of speciﬁc, controlled changes in the game
world.
The social sciences have been studying virtual worlds for some time. Legal
concerns were among the ﬁrst addressed: Lee (2005) examines the legal bound-
aries of online worlds. Psychological and sociological papers mainly focused
on the player behind the online games (see Cole and Grifﬁths (2007), Hendaoui
et al. (2006), Whang and Chang (2004), and Williams et al. (2009)). Medical
papers are often concerned with the addiction effects of online gaming (for
an overview see Kuss and Grifﬁths (2011)). Economic research has been con-
ducted by Castronova (2006b) and Castronova and Falk (2009) who consider
the value of games as ﬁeld experiments, Castronova (2006a) analysing the ef-
fects of real-money trades in online games, and Lehdonvirta (2005) examining
how economic modelling can explain online game behaviour. For an overview
of research on online worlds, see Messinger et al. (2009).
5Some research ﬁnds behaviour in online worlds follows real-world pat-
terns. Burt (2011) argues that virtual worlds have “enormous potential” as
a research venue, especially for social capital research. He raises the concern
of validity, and conﬁrms that virtual worlds provide valid results for two as-
pects of social capital: higher achievement of network brokers, and higher trust
between members of the same network. Chesney et al. (2009) conducted a se-
ries of standard economic experiments in the online world Second Life to test
whether virtual worlds can be used in experimental settings, generally vali-
dating the use of online environments as an experimental tool. For instance,
playing Ultimatum Games (G¨ uth et al., 1982) via an online world, Chesney
et al. do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences from the usual experimental results.
Other research using Second Life for experimental data ﬁnds online players
behaving differently from their real-world counterparts: trust levels and in-
vestments are lower than in comparable real-world experiments (Fiedler et al.,
2011; F¨ ullbrunn et al., 2011), individuals invest on poorly-informed decisions
and stock markets are not efﬁcient (Bloomﬁeld and Cho, 2011), more expe-
rienced traders follow less fundamental value investment strategies (Fiedler,
2011), and communication over virtual world channels increases transferred
assets relative to real-world experiments (Fiedler and Haruvy, 2009).
Previous empiric ﬁndings are thus mixed, even on the same experimental
population (users of the online world Second Life). We nevertheless believe that
game data in particular can provide valuable insights on economic aspects that
are otherwise difﬁcult or impossible to observe. Second Life is not a game, no
particularly competitive environment. Its users are thus not induced to behave
“optimally”. Before using our game data for any empirical research, we must
ﬁrst validate it for economic analysis: are online game markets (as opposed to
online world markets) efﬁcient?
6Hypothesis 1: (Efﬁciency of online game markets) Perfectly substi-
tutable goods show identical price patterns.
Next we move into the markets themselves. Markets trade on information
(French and Roll, 1986; Cutler et al., 1989), with the quality of the information
affecting the price ﬁnding mechanism (Veronesi, 2000). If hypothesis 1 holds,
game markets should possess the same feature.
Any relevant information must reach the players to be of use. Online game
data is the closest one can get to informationally efﬁcient markets (Grossman
and Stieglitz, 1980), as the players are a closely-knit community with low costs
of communicating online. Diffusion theory has been analysed by many ﬁelds,
be they social or natural sciences. For an overview see Chatman (1986). In eco-
nomics, marketing research has analysed the effects of new product diffusion
(Mahajan et al., 1990). Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) analyse the effects
of (social) networks creating a “bandwagon effect” (multiplicator) of diffusion.
De Valck et al. (2009) show “word of mouse” (the online analogy to word of
mouth) having a large effect on information diffusion in online interactions:
Social networks allow a faster diffusion of information. Bolton et al. (2004)
analyse this in online markets: a higher buyer’s or seller’s reputation9 leads to
higher transaction efﬁciency. Gruhl et al. (2004) applies the concept of diffusion
to online blogs, while Prince and Simon (2009) analyse the effect the internet
has had on diffusion times of new products. P´ astor and Veronesi (2009) have
tied asset prices to technological diffusion. We follow Ghossoub and Beladi
(2011), who argue that the stock prices represent the differences and severity
of information diffusion for each stock.
New items introduced differ regarding their “strategic complexity”; their
actual use is not always immediately obvious. Typically, virtual world me-
9Dellarocas and Wood (2008) provide estimates for this using eBay buyer/seller reputations.
7chanics are not fully explained initially, so informed decisions are not possible
immediately. A crucial advantage of online game goods is that their qualities
and complexity can (ex post) be known with certainty: computer game goods
are represented in numbers.
Speciﬁcally, we analyse data from a specialised game-wiki. We compute the
number of edits, and the days it took to get a ﬁnalised version for each game-
good article.10 The longer it takes for an article on the wiki to be updated,
and the more updates are needed, the more difﬁcult it was for the community
to “grasp” the quality of the respective item. The higher the number of ed-
its made on a wiki article, the more complex the good, with many attempts
needed to incorporate all information and ﬁnalise the article. In contrast, a
high number of relatively early edits indicates a well-researched game good.
The uncertainty regarding the good was addressed early in its lifetime and has
since then entered the public knowledge domain.
Hypothesis 2: (Goods in online game markets) Complex goods take
longer to be understood by agents and affect the game market.
Given that different goods have different complexities, differing beliefs on
these complexities will lead to imperfect information, and thus arbitrage pos-
sibilities. A trader believes he has an informational advantage and will buy an
item he thinks will be proﬁtable. Jensen (1982) is the seminal paper on adop-
tion of innovations.11 Wozniak (1987) shows that human capital drives this
adoption of innovations. In our case, an “innovation” is a new game good,
forcing players to adapt playing and trading strategies.
10Like the more well-known Wikipedia, a wiki site allows all users to edit all articles. Each edit
is logged publicly, exposing the entire “creation history” of the article.
11The adoption of technology is similar to the adoption of innovations. Griliches (1957) is an
early example, discussing the adoption of hybrid corn in several US states. A whole literature on
the Technology Adaption Model (TAM) has evolved; for an introduction and critical analysis see
Legris et al. (2003) while King and He (2006) provide a meta-analysis of over 70 TAM studies.
8Broadly speaking, there are two types of players. Content players, with the
goal of “beating” the in-game content. They value acquiring in-game skill to
become faster, “better”, players. The second type, market players are more in-
terested in the game market.
Content players have more game-speciﬁc human capital and do not need to
enter the market to buy an in-game advantage through in-game goods. In con-
trast, players endowed with relatively less game-speciﬁc human capital, and
those that are relatively more interested in the game markets, use the general
human capital “market savvyness” to purchase in-game advantages. In effect,
market players substitute their lack of game-speciﬁc human capital with more
a general human capital. This leads us to our third hypothesis, analysing the
participants of online game markets:
Hypothesis 3: (Agents in game world markets) (Game-speciﬁc) hu-




forth referred to as KoL). KoL is an internet, browser-based, multiplayer12,
game. Figure 1 provides the game basics, with a more detailed description
in appendix 6.1.
To follow our analysis, only two aspects of the game need to be known:
ascension and donation items. First, the concept of ascension: a player who has
nominally ﬁnished the game can choose to re-start at any time. One of the
goals of the game is to ﬁnish an ascension in the shortest time possible, and
12Massively Multiplayer Online games, or MMO games
9 the player creates a character
 the nominal purpose of the game is completing quests
 after completing the primary storyline, players have earned the ac-
complishment of “ascension”, allowing them to restart the game
with a more powerful character
 each ascension can be done in one of eight difﬁculty modes: nor-
mal, or difﬁcult (called “hardcore”), each with three (optional) re-
strictions
 in-game accomplishments are publicly displayed on “leader-
boards”, the most prominent being the speed of the ascension
Figure 1: The Kingdom at a glance
leaderboards computed by the game automatically list players who have ac-
complished these feats.
The second aspect is a donation item: the game itself is free to use, but do-
nating13 10 US$ will generate an item14 called a “Mr. Accessory” (henceforth
“Mr. A”) that is given to the donator’s character. A Mr. A is a fairly power-
ful item and can be bought or sold in the in-game marketplace. Additionally,
a Mr. A can be swapped for a limited-time to obtain the “item of the month”
(henceforth “iotm”) on a one-to-one basis. These iotm are powerful items in
their own right, but also valued investments due to their limited window of
purchase of only one month. Every month, a new iotm is introduced, and a
Mr. A can only be swapped for a speciﬁc iotm in its active month. Once a new
iotm appears, the total supply of the previous iotm is ﬁxed – no more iotm of
that type can be generated by players.
13“Donation” is the term used by the game designers. Economically speaking, it is of course
buying a Mr. A for $10.
14Goods in online games, and in KoL speciﬁcally, are commonly called “items”.
10Each iotm’s purpose or “power” is only hinted at initially, leaving players
to speculate, hypothesise and test to uncover the details. With a new iotm en-
tering the game world every month, the players are forced to formulate new,
or adapt existing, playing strategies. Some items have a higher “strategic com-
plexity” than others; Some iotm substitute for, or complement, existing iotm,
while others introduce entirely new game effects.
KoL includes an in-game marketplace in which nearly all of the in-game
items can be traded. Our data comprises all transactions made in this mar-
ketplace from April 2006 to October 2008. We can identify individual buyers
and sellers over time. The KoL community increased from roughly 850,00015
in April 2006 to nearly 1.8 million in October 2008. The total number of stores
(players can own a “store” and sell items in the game) more than doubled from
48,000 in April 2006 to 115,000 in October 2008.
While we have data on the characters16 in the game, we know little about
the speciﬁc player behind each character. The demographics of other MMOs
are surveyed by Hursthouse (2005), Yee (2006), and Meredith et al. (2009). The
KoLcommunityconductedasurveyoftheplayersin2006, withtheresultspre-
sented in Fnord7 et al. (2006). Randomly selecting 3,000 active players (those
logged into the game in the past 14 days) and achieving a response rate of
roughly one third, the results are close to being representative of the player-
base. 76% reported to be male, compared to 85.4% reported by Yee. The play-
ers are young, 35% are younger than 18, 48% between 18 and 29 years of age,
and 17% are aged 30 or older. This is roughly in line with the average age of
26.57 years stated by Yee. The vast majority of players, 89%, come from na-
tive English-speaking countries: 65% from the US, 10% from the UK, 8% from
Canada, and 6% from Australia and New Zealand. The game consumes a large
15Own data. Numbers collected on April 4th, 2006: 857,723 total players and 48,046 total mall
stores. Numbers for October 1st, 2008: 1,797,178 total players and 115,506 total mall stores.
16avatar is the word commonly used in the literature
11part of the players’ leisure time, with 41% reporting that they play for longer
than 2 hours per day, and 43% reporting that they log onto the game daily
(while 75% play ﬁve days a week). This is smaller than in other games: Hurst-
house and Yee report more than 20 and 22 hours played per week, respectively.
One third of the players stated that they had donated for a Mr. A at least once,
while two thirds said they had not yet donated.
We chose to limit our analysis to donation items: Mr. A and iotm. These are
the most prominent “investment items”, and have relatively liquid markets.
Any player trading these items signals a commitment to play the game (it is
otherwise free to play). Thus, restricting the sample to trades in donation items
eliminates players that never actively engaged in the game. Also, if a character
has owned a donation item once, the character will be ﬂagged as non-delete.
This character will not be deleted from the game servers for inactivity. Limiting
the dataset to trades (and thus traders) of donation items guarantees that we
can use all publicly available information on the respective characters, as they
are not deleted.
From this basic marketplace data, we derive three datasets (one for each hy-
pothesis to test) by combining them with external data from game community
sites.
count mean sd min max
mra 937 4482303 313737.9 3995966 5830000
activeiotm 937 4475119 344549.7 2656562 6094343
N 937
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dataset 1: Donation items
The ﬁrst hypothesis concerns the prices of fully substitutable items. Dur-
ing the active month, a Mr. A can be traded on a one-to-one basis for an iotm.
Hence, for the respective active month, an iotm and a Mr. A are perfect sub-
12stitutes – a player can either buy a Mr. A and trade that for the current iotm,
or buy the iotm directly off the marketplace. We therefore compute two time
series out of our data: a time series of Mr. A prices, and a time series of active
iotm prices. Table 1 summarises the dataset. To construct equi-distant prices
for time series analysis, we aggregate our intraday data at the daily level. The
results presented below are based on the mean of the intraday prices. The
complete dataset was trimmed: we drop the top and bottom 1% of each price
timeseries to exclude outliers.17 Missing dates in our trade data were added
from the “Items of Loathing”18 database, where available.
count mean sd min max
editsday1 27 16.22222 10.88165 1 38
edit mth minus 27 9.333333 10.55025 0 46
edits 27 40.81481 24.8287 11 95
delay 27 .4074074 .9306433 -1 3
meandiff 27 787148.8 920305.6 -397427 3154461
sddiff 27 272194.6 386079.6 -123140.1 1587914
iotm nobs dif 27 45.81481 114.5496 -228 276
mra mean t 27 4456555 303512.6 4037180 5506366
iotm sd t 27 363309.9 292256.7 109677.5 1408041
iotm sd t1 27 560239.2 404127.3 110360.1 1860447
familiar 27 .4814815 .5091751 0 1
skill 27 .1111111 .3202563 0 1
famequip 27 .0740741 .2668803 0 1
mydate 27 17370.7 255.9788 16922 17776
N 27
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for dataset 2: Item data
Forthesecondhypothesis, whichexaminesinformationdiffusionandgoods
in online worlds, we use all data on each individual iotm from our intraday
marketplace data. We combine this data with information on each individual
17We have also used medians as means of aggregation, and winsorised rather than trimmed the
data. The resulting four datasets were used as robustness checks: aggregated by means and by
medians, each set trimmed or winsorised. The results did not change qualitatively.
18http://www.itemsofloathing.com (accessed March 15, 2010), a player-run, non-ofﬁcial
(daily) price database.
13iotm collected from the KoLwiki.19 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of
the items data.
The KoLwiki is the leading community-made game reference site: There
are nearly 19,000 registered users on the wiki, and a total of over 300 million
page views20, making the KoLwiki the largest known reference site for KoL.
Just like the more well-known Wikipedia, the KoLwiki is a wiki site. All users
can edit pages on the wiki, so (economically speaking) the articles contain the
accumulated public knowledge on the game mechanisms.
We use three different proxies for informational complexity of an iotm. The
ﬁrst is the difference in means: we calculate the mean price of the iotm in the ac-
tive month, and its mean price in the ﬁrst month following – the ﬁrst month the
marketprice “ﬂoated” (when it is no longer possible to arbitrage between Mr. A
and the iotm). More valuable items (items with less uncertainty regarding its
functions) should show a larger increase in price difference. Our second proxy
is the difference in standard deviations, again between the active month of the
iotm and the ﬁrst ﬂoating month. If the item is sufﬁciently complex to under-
stand, the market price should be more volatile in adjusting to the free-ﬂoating
regime, and the difference in standard deviations should be larger. Our third
proxy is the difference in actual trade occurrences, again between the active iotm
month, and the ﬁrst ﬂoating month. If the item is more complex, a risk-averse
and uninformed player might not have swapped the iotm in the active month,
and will need to fall back to buying from the market in the next month. A more
complex item should have a larger difference in the number of trades.
The third hypothesis concerns traders. From the marketplace data we ob-
tain a listing of all traders of donation items, and the amount of trades each
made of every item. We combine this data with collected data on the charac-
19http://kol.coldfront.net/thekolwiki/index.php/Main_Page, accessed March 15, 2010
20Numbers from March 2010; see http://kol.coldfront.net/thekolwiki/index.php/
Special:Statistics, accessed March 15, 2010
14ters from two other sources: the Kingdom of Loathing Database (koldb)21, a
database that presents the ascension history of each character of the game, and
the Display Case Database (DCdb)22, a site presenting the publicly displayed
possessions of players. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of this third
dataset.
count mean sd min max
perc speed sc 28534 .4818089 .3472065 0 1
perc speed hc 26874 .2610364 .3502595 0 1
perc speed hco 26224 .1649265 .2962689 0 1
perc dedic sc 28534 .3732749 .2829526 0 .7757
perc dedic hc 26874 .2152113 .2878147 0 .7926
perc dedic hco 26224 .1231036 .2251806 0 .6519
mra buy 29472 7.220107 49.74611 0 4233
iotm buy 29472 2.477911 11.1951 0 685
mra sell 29472 7.220107 57.77676 0 4229
iotm sell 29472 2.477911 16.20814 0 1634
playerid 29472 825911.3 442041.1 13 1792712
clan dummy 29472 .5137758 .4998187 0 1
sc asc 28534 8.391112 17.30919 0 447
hc asc 26874 5.941802 13.88718 0 249
fastest sc 9728 5265.214 9613.392 346 180320
fastest hc 8105 2937.581 3317.145 658 90161
av lvl at asc 12873 17.30677 4.055816 12.9697 50
wealth 29472 8.284141 7.760635 0 25.47765
exploited trade error 29472 .0134365 .1151364 0 1
made trade error 29472 .0128936 .1128175 0 1
total exploited errors 29472 .0247014 .339659 0 19
total made errors 29472 .0247014 .8555947 0 128
mra trader 29472 .2515608 .4339175 0 1
iotm trader 29472 .2507125 .4334307 0 1
N 29472
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dataset 3: Player data
Koldb provides information on the playing habits of each player. Once
a player has ﬁnished all “quests” (essentially sub-chapters of the complete
21http://www.koldb.com, accessed March 15, 2010
22http://www.jickenwings.org/collections/index.cgi, accessed March 15, 2010
15game), he can ascend and start the game over, keeping one in-game skill from
his current ascension. Thus, his next ascension should be faster and/or easier.
There is a large community dedicated to ﬁnishing an ascension as fast as pos-
sible – trying to ﬁnd the “optimal” way to ﬁnish the game. A player with more
ascensions should be able to judge item values faster and more easily. Koldb
reports the number and the type of ascensions of each player, and also how fast
the player is relative to the others. A percentile speed value ranks the players
from slowest to fastest: 0.99 means that 99% of all players are slower than the
character in question. In the same way, the percentile dedication ranks players
from those with the least ascensions of a difﬁculty type to those with the most.
All rankings are computed for the three main difﬁculty modes of the game,
as players self-select into playing these difﬁculty modes. Also from koldb, we
construct a dummy variable if the player is a member of an in-game “clan”, a
voluntary association of players.
Thereareanumberofvariablesthatindicateaplayerputtingmorevalueon
market activities than game-content itself. One is playerid as proxy for char-
acter age. “Older” characters have a lower id number. Younger characters
entered the game later. They were not focal when ﬁrst marketing the game:
gameplay (ascension) does not have such a large appeal to them relative to
the players that entered the game in its early stages. A second variable is the
dummy variable of having exploited a trade mistake. This points to a player
spending considerable time in the market, “hawking” to quickly grab an op-
portunity before others do so. Lastly, game time spent not actually playing the
main game. The average level at ascension is our proxy for this: the higher this
level, the more the character will have done outside of the main game before
he ascends and re-starts the game. This indicates a player who spends more
time in the game after their earliest possible ascension date to participate in the
16marketplace.
We do not have direct information on the wealth of a character, as this in-
formation is not public. However, the DCdb allows us to compute a proxy of
a character’s wealth. Players can (and most do) create a display case to exhibit
any number of items. We compute the market value of this display case as a
proxy for character wealth. Appendix 6.2 lists and brieﬂy explains all variables
of our three datasets used in our regressions.
4 Results
The ﬁrst hypothesis concerns the efﬁciency of the in-game market. The King-
dom of Loathing introduces a new iotm every month. In each month, the data
indicates a Mr. A and the currently active iotm are perfect substitutes.
Figure 2: MrA and iotm prices, June/July 2008
To illustrate this relationship, ﬁgure 2 shows the prices of a Mr. A (blue)
17and the June 2008 iotm (red). They match nearly perfectly, until the end of the
month, when the new iotm for July 2008 arrives (green). The price for the June
iotm spikes23 as the supply is now ﬁxed and the market adjusts the price. The
Mr. A price now follows the July iotm price, again nearly perfectly.
Figure 3: MrA and current active iotm prices
Figure 3 shows the price for Mr. A and the price of the current active iotm
over the course of our dataset. They appear to follow the same pattern. To
be sure, we test for co-integration: an underlying equation that drives the two
time series. Not only should the two prices be identical, but they should simul-
taneously move in identical directions as well.
A prerequisite of the co-integration test is a unit root in at least one of the
time series. Our unit root test results24 are presented in table 4. The results can-
23For a real-world analogy, Ursprung and Wiermann (2011) provide evidence that the price for
art pieces spikes on the day of the artist’s death – an artist’s supply of art is then credibly ﬁxed.
24The lag length was taken from the usual lag-order selection statistics; For the Mr. A, the
Likelihood-Ratio (LR), Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), and Schwarz’s Bayesian
information criterion (SBIC) test return one lag, the ﬁnal prediction error (FPE) and Akaike’s infor-
18adv. Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron
MrA iotm MrA iotm
lags=1 lags=5
-2.637† (0.085) -2.484 (0.119) -2.894 (0.046) -5.643 (0.00)
-2.655 (0.254) -2.490 (0.332) -2.916 (0.157) -5.669 (0.00)
lags=8 lags=6 KPSS
-2.130 (0.232) -2.329 (0.162) MrA iotm
-2.137 (0.525) -2.336 (0.413) 1.108 (Schw.) 1.084 (Schw.)
lags=7 0.391 (N-W) 0.387 (N-W)
-2.272 (0.180)
-2.278 (0.445)
Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10%, : 5%, : 1%
Unit root tests; The null of the DF and PP tests is the time series contains a unit root, the null of KPSS is stationar-
ity (no unit root). MacKinnon’s approximated p-values in parenthesis. The ﬁrst line is the value for the test with
no trend speciﬁed, the second line speciﬁes a trend. For the KPSS tests, the ﬁrst line uses lags derived from the
Schwert criterion, the second line Newey-West optimal bandwidth lags. The critical values for the KPSS tests are
0.216 at the 1% level, for all our tests.
Table 4: Unit Root test results
not reject the possibility of a unit root for the Mr. A and iotm time series with an
advanced Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, at the 5% level. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test
always rejects the null of a unit root for the iotm time series, and yields mixed
results for the Mr. A series. While we are concerned with the results of the iotm
time series, we do not place too much weight on them. We construct this iotm
series by merging the trades of all iotm in their respective ﬁrst months; hence
it actually lines up 27 different time series. As months change, data problems
may occur25, potentially skewing the unit root test results. The Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test is a third unit root test. It differs from the
usual DF and PP tests by setting the null hypothesis as stationarity: absence of
a unit root. All KPSS tests clearly reject the null of stationarity at the 1% level.
mation criterion (AIC) eight. For the iotm, SBIC returns 5 lags, HQIC and LR 6 lags, FPE and AIC
return 7 lags.
25For instance, some iotm may appear on the market a few days late, see our analysis for the
second hypothesis.
19Jointly, all three tests indicate a unit root in both time series, more strongly for
the Mr. A time series. This allows us to continue with the co-integration tests.
We use the Johansen test for co-integration (Johansen, 1988, 1991), which
reveals a rank of one, and thus a single co-integrating equation. The trace
statistic26 at the ﬁrst rank is 4.945, with a 5% critical value of 9.42.
Figure 4: Predicted cointegration of a bivariate VECM of Mr. A and active iotm
prices
To further illustrate the single co-integrating equation property, we ﬁt a bi-
variate vector-error-correction-model (VECM). From the two time series we
generate a predicted co-integrating equation. If the two time series are in-
deed equal, the VECM equation should revert back to zero. The predicted
co-integrating equation in ﬁgure 4 shows no trend: large shocks are apparent
(and especially in the early dates of the dataset there are deviations from the
26We use one lag and specify a restricted constant for the Johanson test, thus allowing for a con-
stant in the co-integrating equations. Results with specifying a restricted trend, and with differing
lag values, all stay under the 5% and 1% critical value.
20zero), but the equation quickly reverts to zero every time.
We conclude that the two time series follow an identical pattern: if the price
for a Mr. A increases, so does the price for the current iotm, and vice-versa.
Thus, we conclude: the in-game market is efﬁcient.
Next, our second hypothesis. Compared to conventional market data, our
dataset possesses the advantage that all goods characteristics are represented
by numbers – as computer game items are essentially just that: a collection
of statistics. Each iotm is connected to an article on the KoLwiki, from which
we can take further information on the respective item. The information being
published on a wiki is public and the wiki structure allows measuring of how
quickly this information generated (i.e., how fast it enters public knowledge).
Table 5 shows the results of our regressions (with robust standard errors)
using each of our three proxies for information diffusion. Our results show
that number of edits on the wiki article of an iotm inﬂuences all three proxies
for information diffusion, while sometimes only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Nevertheless, with only 27 observations, the clarity of these ﬁndings is rather
surprising.
For the difference in means, a larger difference implies that the iotm is seen
asmorevaluablebythemarket. Ourvariableofinterest, edits, showsapositive
effect: the price difference increases with more wiki edits. Simply put, a more
researched item fetches a better price. The two largest control variable effects
are the price of a Mr. A in the active month of an iotm, and “skill”, a dummy
that denotes an iotm that can be used in all difﬁculty modes. These effects are
not surprising, as a perceived-valuable iotm will already drive up the Mr. A
prices in the active month, as the supply of Mr. A is drained to be swapped for
the iotm.
The difference in standard deviations is less clear-cut. It is interesting that
21the total number of edits has no effect. Rather, only the number of edits that
were made in the ﬁrst month (net of the ﬁrst day) matter. The edits made in the
ﬁrst month of the iotm (the active month) have a negative effect on the differ-
enceinstandarddeviations: moreeditsontheﬁrstdayreﬂectmoreuncertainty
of the item, but more edits in the ﬁrst month point to a well-researched item.
Manyupdatesintheﬁrstmonthmeanthattheitemreceivethoroughtestingby
the community. Control variable analysis shows a larger difference in means
leading to a larger difference in standard deviations: higher prices also lead to
more uncertainty in the marketplace if the evaluation was indeed correct. Also
not surprising, “skill” type iotm, those valuable to all players regardless of dif-
ﬁculty mode of the game, leads to a lower difference. These items are generally
seen as a safe bet, so there is little risk associated with them.
Finally, we focus on the difference in the number of trades. Effects of the
edit variables are signiﬁcantly positive for the total edits, and signiﬁcantly neg-
ative for the edits in the ﬁrst month and ﬁrst day. This suggests that total edits
reﬂect an item being more complex, so players do not buy until more details
are discovered: Relatively more trades are made in the second month. Edits
in the ﬁrst month, and especially on the ﬁrst day, on the other hand represent
a dedication of the community to discover precisely these details: more edits
during the ﬁrst month reassure the market that the information is disclosed
and allow it relatively more trades in the ﬁrst compared to the second month.
Examining control variables, skill is no longer is signiﬁcant. It drives the
number of trades in both individual months, but taking differences this cancels
out. Skill-type items are universally seen as very valuable. There are more
trades in the active and more trades in the ﬂoating month. Thus there is no
reason for agents to buy more of these items in the second compared to the ﬁrst
month; they buy in both months. As expected, a higher standard deviation in
22the ﬂoating month leads to a higher difference in trades. More volatility in the
ﬂoating month means that a complex item is not well understood in the ﬁrst
month. Players are buying the iotm later, when its usefulness is uncovered.
Summarising, we use wiki data to measure different setups of informa-
tion diffusion in a market. Early wiki edits point to a less complex, better-
researched item, reducing uncertainty in the market. Relatively more late edits
indicate a complex, not well-understood item, with correspondingly higher
uncertainty in the market.
For the third hypothesis, we examine the agents in these game markets: the
players themselves. Speciﬁcally, we use Heckman selection regressions (Heck-
man, 1976) to analyse which players decide to enter the market for donation
items. The results are shown in tables 6 (Heckman selection) and 7 (Heckman
regression). We discuss two different markets: the market for Mr. A and the
market for iotm.
First, we examine the selection equations. Character wealth does not inﬂu-
ence the decision to enter the Mr. A market. However, it increases the prob-
ability of entering the iotm market. Buying an iotm will beneﬁt the character
immediately, and richer players can afford to buy this in-game advantage with
in-game currency. They do not, however, need to enter the Mr. A market, as an
iotm can be bought directly.
The percentiles of speed and dedication at varying game difﬁculty modes
are particularly interesting. All speed percentiles show a negative effect on
entering the iotm market (second column). All dedication percentiles exhibit
a positive effect on this decision. Content players (those who complete as-
censions quickly) with more game-speciﬁc human capital are less likely, while
more dedicated players (those who complete many ascensions) are more likely
to enter the iotm market.
23At the same time, there are no corresponding effects in the Mr. A market.
However, variables corresponding to the different type of player are signif-
icant: a player who puts weight on market activities rather than ascension.
From our discussion in section 3, these are playerid as a proxy for younger
characters, exploiting a trade mistake, and the average level at ascension as
proxy for time spent not playing the main game. Thus, more market-driven
players enter the Mr. A market.
The differences between the factors that inﬂuence the decision to enter ei-
ther of the two markets reﬂect the differing properties of the items. An iotm is
immediately beneﬁcial to a character wanting to play the game’s non-market
content. Yet, only a maximum of one of each iotm is needed. Players that
primarily play the game content, and the market only casually, are the prime
drivers of this market. A Mr. A, rather, is a stock item. It can be swapped for
later iotm; rational investment decisions are proﬁtable. Players who primarily
trade and secondarily play the game content enter this market.
Heckman regressions results in table 7 reconﬁrm our reasoning. For the
iotm market, the most important variable that pushes the number of iotm
bought (apart from participation in Mr. A market) is clan membership. A clan
is a voluntary grouping of like-minded individuals that can share information
and strategies.27 Clan membership is a co-ordination device: members notice
that they are missing a certain iotm for a particular game strategy, and buy it
on the market. Character wealth and the number of exploited mistakes do not
have any effect on the amount of iotm bought: demand is set by need rather
than by arbitrage. Regarding the number of Mr. A bought, clan membership
has no effect. Rather, wealth and our arbitrage proxy are highly signiﬁcant.
A Mr. A is a normal good in the classic economic sense: the richer the char-
acter, the higher their demand for Mr. A. Speculators also drive a large portion
27This points to some social capital effects in addition to our human capital arguments.
24of trades, market activity increases with more exploited trade mistakes. In con-
trast, activity in the iotm does not inﬂuence the demand for Mr. A. This ﬁnding
reinforces that a Mr. A is used for investment and hedging purposes.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the validity of data from an online computer game market econ-
omy for use in general economic research. We have three primary results. First,
in-game markets are efﬁcient. Second, more complex goods have higher uncer-
tainty, and longer time, in the price-ﬁnding mechanism of the market. Finally,
how human capital endowment affects the market decisions of the agents in
predictable ways.
Our work is of interest to ﬁrms that use a similar “donation”-based28 busi-
ness model, potential designers of virtual worlds, and designers of quasi-ﬁeld
experiments such as those by Castronova et al. (2009), Williams et al. (2011),
and designers of economic experiments using online worlds as the locales for
their experiments such as Fiedler et al. (2011). Online games offers a novel mar-
ket environment that offer new insights on the subject pool, the information
and capital subjects bring with them, and tasks and rules of the markets them-
selves. Using online game worlds is not dissimilar to early attempts at lab-
oratory experiments and the “cigarette economies” of POW camps (Radford,
1945), and will lead to new perspective and results in the ﬁeld of economics.
28The established term in the profession is “F2P”: free to play
25differences in:
OLS means std deviations trades
editsday1 -51592.5 989.2 -10.70
(36794.4) (19170.5) (3.107)
edits1stmth lessday1 -50530.0 -28250.9† -6.647†
(32238.9) (14472.4) (3.639)
edits 55899.9 10638.8 6.027
(24209.8) (12985.2) (2.069)
delay -11925.8 -80130.7 -29.39
(201381.0) (72488.5) (9.852)
mra mean activemonth 0.915 -0.297 -0.00000687
(0.377) (0.177) (0.0000310)
iotm sd activemonth -0.915 —
(0.535)
diff mean — 0.297 —
(0.119)
iotm sd ﬂoatingmonth — — 0.000137
(0.0000481)
familiar 388242.9 83246.1 -24.69
(572699.5) (152973.3) (38.16)
skill 1293596.2 -525238.8 36.27
(513680.7) (166793.4) (36.73)
famequip -85773.0 -159517.4 106.2†
(486249.0) (197571.4) (57.61)
timetrend 436.8 383.6 -0.0480
(782.9) (231.2) (0.0545)
Intercept -11837380.1 -5426528.6 834.3
(13158810.7) (4539117.4) (974.7)
N 27 27 27
R2 0.444 0.620 0.652
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.383 0.434
F(10,16) 5.298 5.165 17.24
Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10%, : 5%, : 1%
Regressingthethreedifferentproxiesforinformationdiffusiononnumberofeditsfortherespectivewikiarticles.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 5: Explaining information diffusion
26Heckman selection mra buy iotm buy
perc speed sc 0.070 -0.749
(0.087) (0.141)
perc speed hc -0.224 -0.603
(0.186) (0.175)
perc speed hco 0.054 -0.424
(0.103) (0.148)
perc dedic sc -0.127 0.354
(0.113) (0.166)
perc dedic hc 0.262 0.710
(0.209) (0.200)




fastest sc 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




av lvl at ascension 0.025 0.010
(0.008) (0.009)
sc asc 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
hc asc 0.013 0.003
(0.006) (0.002)
exploited trade mistake 1.761 0.549
(0.560) (0.238)
made trade mistake 0.542 0.126
(1.060) (0.175)
iotm trader 0.354 –
(0.121)






Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10%, : 5%, : 1%
Heckman Selection Equations with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 6: Heckman selection output
27Heckman regression mra buy iotm buy
iotm buy -0.072 –
(0.170)
mra buy – 0.101
(0.030)
iotm sell 0.891† –
(0.460)






fastest sc 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
fastest hc 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
sc asc 0.157 0.023
(0.039) (0.011)
hc asc -0.085 0.013
(0.052) (0.014)
av lvl at ascension 1.090 0.125†
(0.336) (0.064)
total made mistake 1.577 0.780
(2.258) (0.857)














Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10%, : 5%, : 1%
Heckman Regression results with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 7: Heckman regression output
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Figure 5: Classes in the Kingdom of Loathing
6 Appendix
6.1 The Kingdom in Detail
The Kingdom of Loathing is an online, browser-based game that spoofs tradi-
tional MMORPGs such as Everquest or World of Warcraft. A player generates a
character (avatar) by choosing from one of six character classes (the classes are
visualised in ﬁgure 5). The character can then complete a series of quests and
puzzles until the ﬁnal quest – defeating the Naughty Sorceress – is ﬁnished. At
that point he can opt to stay in the game to accomplish high-level feats or more
effectively earn in-game currency and tradeable items, or ascend, essentially
restarting the in-game content. Upon ascension, the player may choose a new
character class (or the same again), and choses one class-speciﬁc skill he can
permanently keep. So, in general, a character with more ascensions will have
more skills to use and will be able to complete an “ascension” (a full game of
the main quest) faster than a character with fewer ascensions (and thus fewer
skills).
356.2 Full List of Variables
First dataset: Donation items
mra time series of Mr. A prices
activeiotm time series of each currently active iotm prices
Table 8: Variable list and explanation for dataset 1: Donation items
Second dataset: Item data
editsday1 iotm wiki article edits on the ﬁrst day of the item
edit mth minus iotm wiki article edits on the ﬁrst month (net of
ﬁrst day) of the item
edits iotm wiki article total edits
delay delay in days of the iotm release (0 = released on
time on the ﬁrst day of a month)
mra mean t mean price of a Mr. A in the active month of an
iotm
iotm sd t standard deviation of the price of an iotm in its
active month
iotm sd t1 standard deviation of the price of an iotm in its
ﬁrst ﬂoating month
meandiff difference in means between the ﬁrst ﬂoating and
the active month of an iotm
sddiff (iotm sd t - iotm sd t1)
iotm nobs dif difference in trade occurances between the ﬁrst
ﬂoating and the active month of an iotm
familiar dummy variable = 1 if the item is a “familiar”
skill dummy variable = 1 if the item is a “skill” (usable
in all difﬁculty modes)
famequip dummy variable = 1 if the item is a “familiar
equipment”
mydate time variable to catch bias due to increasing play-
ers of KoL
Table 9: Variable list and explanation for dataset 2: Item data
36Third dataset: Player data
perc speed sc percentile ranking of speed over all KoL play-
ers (not only the dataset). 0.99 means 99% of all
players are slower than this character; normal
difﬁculty mode
perc speed hc same, but for hardcore difﬁculty mode
perc speed hco same, but for hardcore oxygenarian difﬁculty
mode
perc dedic sc percentile ranking of dedication (number of as-
censions made). 0.99 means 99% of all players
have less ascensions than this character; nor-
mal difﬁculty mode
perc dedic hc same, but for hardcore difﬁculty mode
perc dedic hco same, but for hardcore oxygenarian difﬁculty
mode
fastest sc turns of the fastest game (normal, “softcore”
difﬁculty mode)
fastest hc turns of the fastest game (“hardcore” difﬁculty
mode)
mra buy total number of Mr. A bought
iotm buy total number of iotm bought
mra sell total number of Mr. A sold
iotm sell total number of iotm sold
playerid unique player ID (smaller = created earlier)
clan dummy variable = 1 if character is member of a
clan
sc asc total number of normal (“softcore”) ascensions
made
hc asc total number of hardcore ascensions made
av lvl at asc average character level at ascension (higher if
character did not ascend immediately)
wealth log of (market value of a character’s display
case +1)
exploited trade error dummy variable = 1 if player bought an item at
less than 10% of the mean market value
Table 10 – continued on next page
37Table 10 – continued from previous page
made trade error dummy variable = 1 if player sold an item at
less than 10% of the mean market value
total exploited errors total number of trades bought at less than 10%
market value
total made errors total number of trades sold at less than 10%
market value
mra trader dummy variable = 1 if bought and sold at least
one Mr. A
iotm trader dummy variable = 1 if bought and sold at least
one iotm
Table 10: Variable list and explanation for dataset 3: Player data
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